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Privacy Implications of GPS Tracking
Technology
SARAH RAHTER-
Abstract: Modem advances in Global Positioning System
("GPS") technology have increased the prevalence of GPS-
enabled devices in our society. Although these devices
provide many valuable services to users, their increasing
accuracy and availability has led to decreased privacy in
areas previously protected. This note examines the
government's collection and use of such technology, along
with the impact this use has on an individual's privacy.
Additionally, this note explains various viewpoints on the
current state of relevant law and advocates the development
of clear legal standards to control when the government can
invade individuals' privacy by collecting location information
about their whereabouts through their GPS-enabled device.
*The author is a 2009 Juris Doctor candidate at The Ohio State University Moritz College
of Law. The author has also earned designation as a Certified Information Privacy
Professional by the International Association of Privacy Professionals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Global Positioning System ("GPS") technology has come a long
way since its inception in 1993.1 As GPS technology has advanced, it
has steadily reduced in size- with some GPS receivers roughly
equivalent in size to that of a postage stamp, 2 and price dropping by
about 50% in the last few years. 3 As the price and size of GPS
receivers have decreased, their accuracy has increased. GPS-enabled
surveillance allows a single person to monitor, remotely and
simultaneously, the movements of multiple individuals for limitless
periods or to determine their precise location at any moment.4 With
recent research reports indicating that by 2012 more than one in ten
people will buy a GPS-enabled mobile device each year,5 it is clear that
technological advancements now enable substantial encroachments
into zones formerly deemed personal. This infiltration of GPS into
our everyday lives has led to concerns regarding the level of privacy
that individuals can expect when using GPS devices.
Currently, no legislation exists to restrict the government's
collection or use of GPS tracking information against suspected
criminals, and only a few states have enacted legislation that restricts
the commercial use of GPS. 6 Absent legislation, the Fourth
Amendment acts as the only federal limit to the government's use of
such technology. However, its protection of individuals from
1 For a closer look into the origin of the Global Positioning System and the advancement of
GPS technology, see Kevin Keener, Personal Privacy in the Face of Government Use of
GPS, 3 ISJLP 473,474 (2007).
2 James Klein, Brave New GPS World, Nov. 3, 2003, GTX CORP.,
http://gtxcorp.com/?q=/news/in-the news.
3 Charles Murray, GPS Makers Lock on to Personal Security Technology, EETIMES.COM,
Aug. 15, 2002, http://www.eetimes.com/story/OEG2002o815So051.
4 See infra Parts L.A and I.B for a full discussion of the functioning of GPS systems used for
enhanced surveillance.
5 To purchase the complete report, see HARRY WANG, GPS: A PATH TO NEW APPLICATION ON
MOBILE DEVICES (May 2oo8), http://parksassociates.ecnext.com/coms2/summary-o256-
9984_ITM; see also, GPS-integrated Mobile Devices Head for Ubiquity, GIZMAG, June 9,
2008, at 1, available at http://www.gizmag.com/gps-integrated-mobile-devices-head-for-
ubiquity/9443/.
6 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-9-609 (2003); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1936(6)(o) (2002); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 20 Art. 26 § 396-z (2006).
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unreasonable search and seizure has become less effective in our
society, where technological advancements operate to reduce the
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in public.7
New technology enables unprecedented government access into
particularized activities and locations of individuals. Unfortunately,
government efforts to establish policies to protect the individual's
right to privacy lag behind these technological advancements. With
little legislative guidance, it remains unclear what level of individual
privacy the law is prepared to recognize in a society permeated by
technology.
This note considers what limits the Constitution, federal and state
statutes, and current case law impose on government use of GPS and
other tracking technology. Part I of this article examines the
capabilities of vehicular GPS and the privacy implications associated
with government use of such technology. Part II presents the privacy
implications of cellular phones with tracking technologies and the
current regulation limiting the government's access to information
transmitted through and stored by cellular service providers. Part III
examines the academic perspective on government use of GPS
technology and the contention that the Fourth Amendment affords
greater protection for individuals against government intrusion than
current law provides.
II. IN-CAR NAVIGATION
"Of the new vehicles currently on the road, fifteen percent are
equipped with [GPS devices]."8 Telematics refers to automobiles
receiving remote information from commercial service providers,
including such services as Global Positioning System ("GPS"), on-
demand entertainment, Internet and Web access, or weather and
traffic conditions.9 "With more than two million subscribers and fifty
7 The Supreme Court has shown reluctance in restricting the efficient collection of
information through technological means, where that information could permissibly be
collected through traditional means. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967); United States v. Knotts, 46o U.S. 276, 282 (1983); but see Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that government surveillance using devices not in general
public use to obtain information about the interior of the home was a search considered
.presumptively unreasonable without a warrant").
8 GPS Steering You in the Wrong Direction?, ABC NEWS, Jan. 15, 2oo8,
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Consumer/story?id=4136269.
9 Cherise Fong, What is Telematics?, CNN.COM, Jan. 3, 2oo8,
http://www.cnn.com/2oo7/TECH/12/2o/skorea.telematics/index.html#cnnSTCText.
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GM OnStar-enabled vehicles, OnStar is the leading provider of
telematics services in the United States."10 OnStar offers a list of
services including everything from turn-by-turn navigation, stolen
vehicle location, and AccidentAssist to remotely unlock doors or turn
on the vehicle's horn and lights.",
Vehicles without factory-installed GPS may utilize new Personal
Navigation Devices ("PNDs") for in-car navigation. PNDs come in
many varieties and provide almost the same functionality as in-car
navigation systems, but at a fraction of the cost. Some PNDs can
monitor vehicles through a small box plugged into a car dashboard,
allowing the remote download of data from the box, including the
car's location and speed, onto computers.12 Others deliver GPS real-
time tracking information covertly by magnetically attaching to the
car's undercarriage. 3 The proliferation of GPS vehicle navigation
raises concerns about encroachments on individual privacy as third
parties access vehicle-tracking information. The following section
outlines current federal and state regulation relating to government
installation and use of GPS vehicle tracking.
A. FEDERAL REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY
On December 1, 2006, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure was amended to set forth procedures for federal agents to
obtain, process, and return warrants for installation and use of
tracking devices. 14 Unfortunately, neither the amended Rule 41, nor
the tracking-device statute 5 specifies the standard an applicant must






12 GPS Technology Helps Parents Track Teens, NEwSHOUR EXTRA, Feb. 19, 2007,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/jan-juneo7/gps-2-19.pdf.
13 GPS Tracking Key, GPS TRACKING REVIEW.COM, Apr. 4, 2008,
http://www.gpstrackingreview.com/2oo8/04/gps-tracldng-key/.
14 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.
15 The purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 3117, also referred to as the "Tracking Device Statute," is to
provide a court with extra-territorial jurisdiction over use of tracking devices installed
within its jurisdiction. This provision does not itself affirmatively require that the
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meet to install a tracking device. 16 Absent concrete legislative
protection from GPS tracking, individuals have challenged such
tracking as an unreasonable search or seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.
While the Fourth Amendment does not provide a general
constitutional right to privacy, it does protect citizens from any
government intrusions that constitute unreasonable searches and
seizure. 17 Different standards have evolved to describe the level of
proof that law enforcement must have before conducting a legally
permissible search of a person or property. Probable cause is the
highest standard, which must be met to procure a warrant, while a
showing of clear and articulable facts establishes the lesser showing of
reasonable suspicion.'8 The Supreme Court created the presumption
that police must secure a warrant prior to conducting a search of a
suspect, absent exigent circumstances. 19 Thus, the central issue in
GPS tracking cases is whether the use of the GPS device constitutes a
search. If it does, than it follows that police must secure a warrant
prior to using a GPS device to track a suspect, absent exigent
circumstances. If a court, however, finds that government use of a
GPS device is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, then no
warrant is necessary and the Fourth Amendment requires a lower
burden of proof on the part of the government before allowing them to
track suspects using GPS.
While the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the
installation of a GPS tracking device constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment, it has established the general limitations on
government obtain such a warrant or other order, or otherwise define the standards under
which the use of a tracking device may be authorized. See In the Matter of the Application
of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication
Service to Disclose Records to the Government, 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 593, 595 (W.D. Pa
2008) (noting that the Tracking Device Statute does not specify the evidentiary standard
applicable to the installation of a tracking device).
16 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2008).
17 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
i8 Different standards apply for national security surveillance. For a discussion of these
standards, see generally Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Law, 72 GWLR 13o6 (2004).
19 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390
(1978).
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government use of tracking technology through case law.20 Katz v.
United States was the first case in which the Court determined that
"what a person knowingly exposes to the public.., is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection."' 21 In United States v. Knotts, the
Court determined that the warrantless tracking of a beeper did not
constitute a violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment right,22
reasoning, "a person traveling in an automobile.., has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movement from one place to another."23
Referencing the Knotts24 decision, a district court in United States
v. Eberle stated that "use of a radio transmitter to monitor an
automobile's progress on public roads is not a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."25 The next year, in United
States v. Mclver, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant did not
have an expectation of privacy in the undercarriage of his truck and
that the defendant did not demonstrate that he intended to shield the
undercarriage from inspection by others.26 Therefore, the attachment
and use of a GPS device by the police was not an unreasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment.27 The court further determined that
the placement of the GPS was not a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment as there was no evidence that the device deprived
defendant of dominion and control over his vehicle or that the
presence of the device caused damage to the vehicle's electronic
components. 28 Nonetheless, courts have disallowed routine
government surveillance where such surveillance cannot be completed
with "a minimum of interference" with the in-car navigation system. 29
20 For a discussion on the evolution of Supreme Court case law on the subject of
government use of tracking technology see Keener, supra note 1, at 476.
21 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
22 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 276.
23 Id. at 281.
24 Id. at 276.
25 United States v. Eberle, 993 F. Supp. 794, 798 (D. Mont. 1998).
26 United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999).
27 Id.
28/d.
29 Company v. United States (In re United States), 349 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 2003)
(ultimately finding in-car navigation service provider not required to commence cellular
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As of this writing, the most recent federal case that determined the
constitutionality of warrantless installation and use of GPS by the
government to track a suspect's vehicle was U.S. v. Moran. 30
Equating GPS tracking with visual surveillance, the court held that the
warrantless use of GPS by police to track Moran was permissible
under the Fourth Amendment because, "Moran had no expectation of
privacy in the whereabouts of his vehicle on a public roadway."31
However, as the log and recording functions of GPS devices progress-
providing far more detailed records than visual surveillance could ever
have provided-the same rule continues to be applied by federal
courts, and accordingly, what is out in the open can be tracked by
technology. The exception to this rule of permissibility is instances
where surveillance by law enforcement goes beyond a "minimum of
interference" with the GPS system.
In Company v. United States (In re United States), the Court
addressed when a company, not a common carrier, possessing the
ability to facilitate the interception of oral communications, may be
required to assist law enforcement in intercepting such
communications.32 In this case, court orders required the company to
assist the FBI in eavesdropping on conversations occurring inside a
vehicle equipped with a GPS system.3 3 The Court held that if the
company was both a "provider of wire or electronic communication
service" and an "other person" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(4), it could be required to furnish facilities and technical
assistance.34 However, the Court also noted that "court orders granted
pursuant to the authority of § 2518 must specify that assistance be
provided 'unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the
services that such service provider, landlord.., or person is according
the person whose communications are to be intercepted."' 35 In
connection function of vehicle to enable FBI eavesdropping on oral communications within
the car because the FBI's use of the passive listening feature disabled other system services,
and therefore, the surveillance could not be completed with "a minimum of interference"
with the system's operation as required under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) wiretap law).
30 See United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425,432 (N.D.N.Y 2005).
311d. at 467.
32 Company, 349 U.S. at 1137.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1144.
35 Id.
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Company, the Court held that because FBI surveillance completely
disabled the monitored car's GPS system, and severely hampered the
emergency features of the car, Company was not required to assist the
FBI in interception of the phone conversations because it could not be
done with "a minimum of interference" with the service provided by
Company, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4).36
In addition to protecting citizens from government surveillance
that interferes with their GPS systems, federal case law also places
Fourth Amendment restrictions on the government's use of GPS
where such use intrudes upon the suspect's home or curtilage
thereof.37 The home exception to otherwise lawful technologically
enhanced searches is well established.38 Following the establishment
of this exception, the Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States held
that the government's use of a thermal-imaging device constituted a
search in violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment right and
that government use of surveillance devices not in general public use,
to obtain information about the interior of the home, is a search
considered "presumptively unreasonable without a warrant."39 Thus,
these federal cases suggest that government use of GPS technologies
to track suspects without a warrant is legally permissible so long as
the surveillance is conducted outside the home or curtilage thereof,
with widely available technology, and does not result in more than a
minimum of interference into the tracked object's system operation.
36 Id. at 1146.
37 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 18o (1984) (curtilage encompasses area
"immediately surrounding and associated with the home... to which extends the intimate
activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life'").
38 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961) (warrantless police intrusion
into defendant's home violates the Fourth Amendment even if the information thus
collected could have been obtained by other means); see also United States v. Moore, 562
F.2d 1o6, 114 (1st Cir. 1977) (warrantless use of a beeper inside a box of chemicals to
determine their continued presence in the residence infringed on defendants' Fourth
Amendment rights); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (monitoring a
beeper becomes a search under the Fourth Amendment when it reveals "a critical fact
about the interior" of a home); see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176-78 (holding that individuals
"may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except
in the area immediately surrounding the home").
39 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
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B. STATE REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY
While federal law permits the warrantless attachment of an
electronic monitoring device to the exterior of a person's vehicle,
"states are free to interpret their own constitutional provisions as
providing greater protections than analogous federal provisions."4o A
few states-Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, and Illinois-have amended their
constitutions to include express provisions protecting their citizens
against government invasions of privacy, including those perpetrated
through the use of electronic surveillance.41 State courts remain split
over the use of GPS tracking devices by law enforcement, with some
following the federal model and others requiring warrants before
allowing installation of such devices.
1. STATES WHERE No WARRANT IS REQUIRED
In California, Nevada, and Wisconsin, law enforcement agents do
not need to obtain a warrant before using GPS technology to track a
suspect. 42 A California Appeals Court ruled that no warrant is
necessary where police attach a GPS monitor to the outside of a
vehicle and monitor its signals while traveling.43 The court held police
examination of the undercarriage of a vehicle-to touch it, or to attach
a tracking device to it-does not amount to a search under the Fourth
Amendment, "so long as a police officer does so from a place where
40 Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323, 325 (2002) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041
(1983)).
41 The Illinois Constitution provides, "The people shall have the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures,
invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other
means. No warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." ILL. CONST. art.
1, § 6. Similarly, the Hawaiian Constitution states, "The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."
HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 6. Likewise, the Alaskan Constitution states, "The right of the people
to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed." ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. Finally, the
Florida Constitution states, "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free
from governmental intrusion into the person's private life except as otherwise provided
herein." FLA. CONST. art. 1 § 23.
42 For an in-depth analysis of the progression of state law regarding government tracking
through GPS technologies, see Keener, supra note 1, at 481.
43 People v. Zichwic, 94 Cal. App. 4 th 944 (6th Dist. 2001).
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the officer has a right to be."44 Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Nevada concluded that police use of a monitoring device attached to
defendant's vehicle without a warrant did not constitute an
unreasonable search because the defendant had neither a subjective
nor an objective expectation of privacy in the bumper of his vehicle.45
Most recently, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
Wisconsin held in United States v. Garcia that police placement and
use of a GPS tracking unit attached to the defendant's car did not
constitute a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 46 In Garcia, police suspected the defendant was
involved in the manufacturing of methamphetamines, so they
installed a GPS device to the defendant's vehicle while the car was
parked on a public street.47 After reviewing the information obtained
from the GPS device, police obtained a warrant and after searching
the locations where the vehicle had been driven, found materials used
to manufacture methamphetamines.48 Accordingly, defendant was
charged "with crimes relating to the manufacture of
methamphetamine."49 Stating that "[t]here is a tradeoff between
security and privacy, and often it favors security,"50 Judge Posner, as
author of the opinion, denied the defendant's request to suppress
evidence obtained from the tracking device as fruit of an
unconstitutional search.51 In his decision, Posner noted that the
advancement of technology enables an evisceration of privacy and
allows for "an extent of surveillance that in earlier times would have
been prohibitively expensive."52 He did not, however, resolve the
issue by endorsing or dismissing the dangers of mass surveillance.
Instead, he notes that "[s]hould government someday decide to
institute programs of mass surveillance of vehicular movements, it
44 Id. at 956.
45 Osburn, 118 Nev. at 327.
46 United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).
47 Id. at 995.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 998.
51 Id. at 997.
52 Id. at 998.
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will be time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment should
be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search."53
2. STATES WHERE A WARRANT IS REQUIRED
In contrast to California, Nevada, and Wisconsin, warrants are
required in Oregon, Washington, and Louisiana under state law
before police may employ vehicle-tracking transmitters.4 The courts
in Oregon, Washington, and Louisiana all found that police use of a
tracking device was a particularly intrusive method of surveillance
and, as such, required police to obtain a warrant before using such
technology, in the absence of an obviating exigency.55 In these states,
any warrantless use of GPS tracking technology is presumptively
unreasonable and it follows that any evidence obtained through such a
search will be excluded in the courts of these states as the fruits of an
unconstitutional search.
3. A STATE WITH CONFLICTING CASE LAW
In New York, two courts of equal authority have considered the
issue, reaching conflicting conclusions. The Nassau County Court
held in People v. Lacey that installation of GPS on a car reportedly
used in a string of burglaries fell within both federal and New York
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures.56
The court emphasized the explicit protection provided by Article 1,
53 Id.
54 For a thorough examination of the progression of state law in this area, see Keener,
supra note 1, at 481.
55 See State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1047 (Or. 1988) (while the text of the Oregon law
and the federal Constitution are similar, the Oregon Supreme Court construed their state
Constitution more broadly by holding that "a privacy interest... is an interest in freedom
from particular forms of scrutiny"); see also State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 264 (Wash.
2003) (finding that "[u]se of GPS tracking devices is a particularly intrusive method of
surveillance, making it possible to acquire an enormous amount of personal information
about citizens under circumstances where the individual is unaware that every single
vehicle trip taken and the duration of every stop may be recorded by the government);
State v. Peters, 546 So. 2d 829, 834 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1989) (noting that police had guarded
against any Fourth Amendment violation by obtaining a warrant prior to attaching a
beeper to defendant's car).
56 People v. Lacey, No. 50358U, slip. op. at 1 (N.Y.S.2d May 6, 2004).
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§ 12 of the New York Constitution that extends Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures to telephone
and telegraph communications, reasoning that the same protection
should extend to the installation of a GPS device.57 In the opinion,
Judge Calabrese acknowledged that persons have diminished
expectations of privacy in automobiles on public roads, but stressed
that "the mere act of parking a vehicle on a public street does not give
law enforcement the unfettered right to tamper with the vehicle by
surreptitiously attaching a tracking device."58
In contrast, the New York County Court for Westchester County
agreed with the Moran District Court for the Northern District of New
York, holding that police did not need a warrant prior to attaching a
GPS unit to defendant's RV.59 Since defendant did not own the vehicle
and had no legitimate expectation of privacy in its movements on
public roads, the court found he had no privacy expectation sufficient
to establish standing to challenge use of the GPS device within the
purview of the Fourth Amendment.6° The court went on to find that
"no greater privacy interest is afforded to a vehicle traveling upon a
public roadway under the New York State Constitution than that
which is afforded under the United States Constitution." 61 The court
went further, stating that, "there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the movements of a motor vehicle traveling upon public
roadways such that law enforcement is required to obtain a warrant
under New York state law prior to installing a GPS device when
investigating crime."62
This split leaves the future unclear for prospective challenges to
New York law enforcement's warrantless use of GPS technology.
However, in considering the Gant and Moran holdings together, it
seems the New York Constitution does not require law enforcement to
obtain a warrant. 63
57 Id. at 5.
58 Id. at 8.
59 People v. Gant, No. 25307, slip op. at 3-5 (N.Y.S.2d July 27, 2005).
60 Id. at 845-46.
61 Id. at 847-48.
62 Id.
63 Relying on Knotts, both courts determined that the defendant had not established a
legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle traveling upon a public roadway such that law
enforcement was required to obtain a search warrant prior to its installation of a GPS
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1II. CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS AND STORED RECORDS
The following section examines the privacy implications
associated with the use of cellular phones integrated with tracking
technologies and the current regulation on the government's access to
information transmitted through such cellular phones and stored by
service providers. For a cellular phone to receive calls there must be
continuous communication between the physical phone and the
carrier's satellite towers.64 This signal communication can be used by
carriers to track the whereabouts of individuals by triangulating the
signal (measuring the relative time delays in the signal from the phone
to three different base stations). 65 Developing technology coupled
with an increasing number of cell sites built to handle the rapidly
expanding cell phone market have led to increased accuracy in
triangulating the physical location of a user.
The push for increased accuracy in triangulating the physical
location of a user was prompted by the Federal Communications
Commission and supported by many professional organizations as a
means of aiding emergency services. 66 Government response came
through a federal regulation aimed at enhancing 911 Service. 67 The
regulation requires service providers to "achieve 95 percent
penetration of location-capable handsets among its subscribers." 68
Traditionally, cellular carriers have averaged their compliance with
FCC rules over an entire state or multi-state region, but the FCC
announced new rules on September 11, 2007, requiring operators to
meet FCC requirements within every 911 calling area by 2012.69 As
device to track the vehicle's whereabouts. See Gant, No. 25307, slip op. at 846; Moran,
349 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
64 OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES AND THE NATIONAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 81 (1995),
http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1995/9547/9547o6.PDF.
65 id. at 98.
66 Darren Handler, An Island of Chaos Surrounded by a Sea of Confusion: The E911
Wireless Device Location Initiative, lo VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2005) (discussing the
evolution of 911 and GPS triangulation to locate wireless callers).
67 47 C.F.R. § 20.18 (2oo6).
68 Id.
69 Marguerite Reardon, FCC Mandates More Stringent E911 Compliance, CNET
NEWS.COM, Sept. 12, 2007, http://www.news.com/FCC-mandates-more-stringent-E911-
compliance/2100-1039_3-6207530.html.
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technology builds, so do concerns about the privacy implications of
such technology, with many people fearing government misuse of the
staggering amount of data collected by service providers. The
following section examines the numerous legal standards that courts
have adopted for government access to information and how those
legal standards affect regulation of government surveillance. In
addition, the differing positions of the Department of Justice and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation regarding what standard should apply
to such government surveillance will be examined.
A. OVERVIEW OF LEGAL STANDARDS FOR GOVERNMENT ACCESS OF
COMMUNICATIONS AND STORED DATA7O
Privacy law has not kept pace with emerging technology. Thus far,
court cases contemplating new technologies have been inconclusive or
inconsistent in their holdings, offering few clear restrictions on
government surveillance. As courts and legislators have grappled with
various technologies, multiple legal standards have emerged for
government access to information. The law seems clear in the area of
stored data: the government is able to access any collected
information from a third party with only a subpoena if the records are
likely to lead to relevant evidence and this access will not violate the
Fourth Amendment.71 In all other areas, a sliding scale of legal
standards exists with different standards applying to different
information, depending on the sensitivity of the information.72 Since
no statute delineates precise standards for government location
tracking, the recurring question for courts and legislatures is which of
these standards to apply to emerging technologies.
7o For an explanation of background case law relating to government tracking of cellular
phones and government access to stored records regarding location, see Keener, supra
note 1, at 489-95.
71 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (Where information was voluntarily
conveyed to a third-party bank, the Court held that the defendant took "the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information [would] be conveyed by that person to
the Government.").
72 The Center for Democracy and Technology provides a chart outlining what information
the government can get and what standard must be met to obtain that information.
According to the chart, law enforcement's real-time interception of dialed numbers by pen
register/trap and trace devices are not subject to a showing of probable cause. See Ctr. for
Dem. & Tech., Current Legal Standards for Access to Papers, Records, and
Communications: What Information Can the Government Get About You, and How Can




As summarized in Part L.A of this note, with some distinguished
exceptions, a search is only reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
if carried out pursuant to a warrant. Warrants are issued by a judge
based on a finding of probable cause to believe that a crime either is
being, has been, or is about to be committed and that the search will
lead to evidence of the crime.73 In essence, all the government must
show to prove probable cause is that a reasonably prudent person
would believe that the search of a particular area will produce
evidence of a crime given the totality of the circumstances.74
2. PROBABLE CAUSE PLUS
In the Katz and Berger cases, the Supreme Court held that the
Fourth Amendment protects the content of telephone calls and face-
to-face conversations.75 Congress responded to the Court's decisions
in the Katz and Berger cases by adopting the "Wiretap Act" that set
procedures for court authorization of real-time surveillance of all
kinds of electronic communications, including voice, e-mail, fax, and
Internet, in criminal investigations.76 The Act normally requires that a
judge issue an order, based on an affidavit provided by the
government, that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has
been, is being, or is about to be committed before a wiretap can
commence.77
73 James Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Updating Privacy Protections to Keep Pace
with Technology, 935 PLI/PAT 543,552 (2008).
74 Garcia, 474 F.3d at 996.
75 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (holding that government interception of telephone calls
constitutes a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment); see also Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (suggesting that the uniquely intrusive aspects of wiretaps
required procedural protections beyond those provided by a basic search warrant).
76 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2522 (2006) (a 1968 statute discussing telecommunications).
77 Id. See also Ctr. for Dem. & Tech., The Nature and Scope of Governmental Electronic
Surveillance Activity, July, 2006, http://www.cdt.org/wiretap/wiretap-overview.html.
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3. REASONABLE SUSPICION BASED ON "SPECIFIC AND ARTICULABLE
FACTS"
Reasonable suspicion requires a lower burden of proof than
obtaining a warrant and probable cause. Where the burden is
reasonable suspicion, police may obtain cell site information upon a
presentation of "specific and articulable facts showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information sought are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." 78
Congress's decision to leave the Pen/Trap Statute unchanged has
resulted in a higher standard of protection for transactional data in
storage than for transactional data in transit. 79 In jurisdictions
requiring probable cause, a search warrant issued by the court is the
only document compelling company disclosure of real-time tracking
information to law enforcement. Therefore, in jurisdictions requiring
probable cause, companies must only release information where law
enforcement serves upon them a valid search warrant based on the
high standard of probable cause.
4. LESS THAN REASONABLE SUSPICION
In 1979, the Supreme Court ruled that individuals have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in digits dialed from one's home
phone.8° Therefore, installation and use of a pen register (a record of
outgoing calls from a particular number) or trap and trace (a record of
incoming calls to a particular number) by the police is not a search.
To obtain a pen register or trap and trace device order (Pen/Trap), the
government only needs to show that "the information likely to be
obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. "81 A judge
must approve any government request for a Pen/Trap upon a mere
certification of relevance, a drastically decreased standard than the
probable cause standard required for searches under the Fourth
Amendment. 82 However, if the government only obtains a court order
78 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2oo6).
79 Dempsey, supra note 73, at 555.
80 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 738 (1979).
81 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (2006).
82 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1) (2006).
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for a Pen/Trap, "call identifying information" 83 should not include
"any information that may disclose the physical location of the
subscriber."84 Therefore, government agents that only obtain a court
order for a Pen/Trap may only obtain the general cell site location
information from the communications carrier.
B. OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS ON CURRENT LEGAL STANDARDS
The specific issue of whether real-time cell site information
requires a higher burden than that of pen register information (a
record of outgoing calls from a particular number) or trap and trace
information (a record of incoming calls to a particular number) has
been decided in fewer than twenty courts across the United States. In
these cases, the government alleges that the Pen/Trap Statute and the
Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), which forbid disclosure of cell
site information "solely pursuant" to a Pen/Trap order, 85 allow
disclosure of cell site information pursuant to an "articulable facts"
order issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). This argument, often referred
to as the hybrid theory, asserts that by working pursuant to both the
SCA and the Pen/Trap statute, the government has the right to obtain
cell site information without probable cause or a search warrant.
Traditionally, judges have not held law enforcement officials to a high
burden when issuing phone warrants, but groups like the American
Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and the Electronic Frontier
Foundation ("EFF") have fought the Department of Justice ("DOJ")
for over a decade to ensure that the courts hold law enforcement to a
higher burden of proof prior to issuing a phone warrant.
While the DOJ regularly obtains court orders or warrants in order
to collect telephone data, the government has increasingly
participated in wiretapping without first obtaining warrants since
September 11, 2001. The DOJ claims that "[w]arrantless
eavesdropping on calls between people in this country and suspected
terrorists overseas is a legal and 'indispensable' part of safeguarding
the nation against future attacks" and that the practice does not
83 Call identifying information is defined by the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 as "dialing or signaling information that identifies the origin,
direction, destination, or termination of each communication generated or received by a
subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a telecommunications carrier."
47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(A) (2oo6).
84 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B) (2006).
85 See id.
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violate constitutionally protected civil liberties. 86 In addition to
tapping phone lines, the DOJ began requesting that they be allowed to
gather real-time location data of cellular telephones along with
Pen/Trap orders. The ACLU and the EFF have continually challenged
the DOJ's requests for real-time cell phone tracking information,
arguing that real-time tracking is "invasive" and poses such a threat to
privacy that the DOJ should be required to show probable cause
before obtaining a warrant to obtain such information. 87
A majority of the courts denied the government's requests,
concluding that, "statutory authority for prospective cell site location
information is lacking."88 These courts were not convinced that the
SCA refers to real-time data or that the Pen/Trap statute gives a right
to information tracking a user's location. Under this approach, the
only way to grant the government access to such information is under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(d)(1), which requires a
showing of probable cause before a search warrant is issued. 89
Currently, only two judges-both from the Southern District of New
York-have dissented from the majority position, adopting a broad
interpretation of the PATRIOT Act's expansion of the definition of
86 Humphrey Cheung, EFF Battles DOJ on Real-time Cell Phone Tracking, TG DAILY, Oct.
27, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.tgdaily.com/content/view/21217/118/.
87 Id.
88 In re App. of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain
Cellular Tel., 2006 WL 468300, *1 (S.D.N.Y.); see In re Matter of App. for an Order Auth.
the Installation and use of a Pen Register and Directing the Disclosure of Telecomms.
Records for the Cell Phone assigned the No. [Sealed], 439 F. Supp. 2d 456,457 (D.Md.
2006); In re of the Application of the U.S. for an Order Auth. (1) Installation and Use of a
Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device or Process, (2) Access to Customer Records, and
(3) Cell Phone Tracking, 441 F. Supp. 2d 816 (S.D. Tex. 2006); In re App. of the U.S. for an
Order (1) Auth. the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device (2)
Auth. the Release of Subscriber and Other Info. and (3) Auth. the Disclosure of Location-
Based Servs., 2006 WL 1876847 (N.D.Ind.); In re App. of the U.S. for Orders Auth. the
Disclosure of Cell Cite Info., 2005 WL 3658531 (D.D.C.); In re App. of the U.S. for Orders
Auth. the Install. and Use of Pen Registers and Caller Identification Devices on Tel. Nos.
[Sealed], 416 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D.Md. 2006); In re App. of the U.S. for an Order Auth.
Installation and Use of a Pen Register and/or Trap and Trace and the Disclosure of
Subscriber and Activity Info., 415 F. Supp. 2d 211 (W.D.N.Y. 2oo6); In re App. of the U.S.
for an Order Auth. the Release of Prospective Cell Site Info., 407 F. Supp. 2d 134 (D.D.C.
2006); Wisconsin Decision, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 947, 949 (2006); E.D.N.Y. Decision, 396
F.Supp.2d 294, 295 (2005); Maryland I Decision, 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (2005); Texas
Magistrate Decision, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (2005).
89 See In re App. of the U.S. for an Order Auth. the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap Device,
396 F. Supp. 2d. 294, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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"pen register,"9o and holding that the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA") 91 requires use of an additional
authority when ordering disclosure of prospective cell site
information. These courts have rejected the majority position-
deciding that the SCA provides the additional statutory authority
required under CALEA.92
While government access to third-party stored records requires
only a subpoena for records containing relevant location
information,93 law enforcement's use of cellular real-time tracking
faces different rules in different jurisdictions. In the minority of
jurisdictions, police may obtain cell site information upon a showing
of "specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic
communication, or the records or other information sought are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation."94 In
jurisdictions requiring probable cause, a search warrant issued by the
court is the only document compelling company disclosure of real-
time tracking information to law enforcement. Therefore, companies
in the listed jurisdictions must release any information requested by a
valid search warrant served upon them. However, companies
remaining outside these jurisdictions may be compelled to release
information upon a lesser standard than probable cause.
IV. ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE ON PRIVACY AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Courts to date have generally held that individuals have waived
their right to privacy when in public, and thus, there are few barriers
to GPS tracking. In a new book challenging this status quo, however,
legal scholar Christopher Slobogin, has suggested an alternative
approach that would apply stricter Fourth Amendment protections.
In Privacy at Risk: The New Government Surveillance and the
90 Finding that the term "signaling information" added by the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001
includes cell phones since they emit signal information. See Pub.L. No. 107-56, § 216(c)(2),
115 Stat. 272, 290 (2001).
9147 U.S.C. § lOO et seq. (2oo6).
92 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2006).
93 See FED. R. CiV. P. 26(b).
94 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006).
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Fourth Amendment, Slobogin examines the government's use of
surveillance and how new surveillance technologies are allowing the
government to subvert the privacy protections of the Fourth
Amendment.95
Slobogin contends that, while government use of surveillance is a
potent law enforcement tool, it represents an insidious assault on the
freedom of Americans and should be subject to meaningful regulation,
which current law fails to provide.96 He asserts that, "[t]he assault
comes from government monitoring of our communications, actions,
and transactions. The failure results from the inability or
unwillingness of courts and legislatures to recognize how pervasive
and routine this government surveillance has become."97 Slobogin
insists that Americans have a right to public anonymity and to
preserve this right, the judicial decisions outlined in Parts I and II of
this article need to be reversed or reinterpreted to permit much more
significant regulation of government use of surveillance. In his own
words: "This book is meant to prod legislatures and courts into more
meaningful constraints on physical and transaction surveillance."
Slobogin states that existing government surveillance techniques "[i]n
their current minimally regulated state.., do real harm to individual
interests and ultimately to society and government itself. That state of
affairs must change."98
Expanding a framework developed by the Supreme Court almost
forty years ago in Terry v. Ohio, 99 Slobogin proposes the
proportionality principle to replace the current Fourth Amendment
framework used by the courts. The proportionality principle
advocates that when contemplating surveillance, courts should
require the government to provide justification proportionate to the
intrusiveness of the surveillance, and in all non-exigent
circumstances, the government should be required to seek third-party
authorization.100 Slobogin explainslol that his approach to the Fourth
95 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 1 (The University of Chicago Press 2007).
96 Id. at 5.
97 Id. at viiii.
98 Id. at x.
99 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
100 SLOBOGIN, supra note 95, at 21.
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Amendment and its application to surveillance are largely an
elaboration of the principle in Terry that, "[t]here is 'no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure)
entails. "'102
In order to employ the proportionality analysis proposed by
Slobogin, courts must first establish a hierarchy of invasiveness in
order to gauge the relative intrusiveness of a police action that is
considered a search or a seizure. 103 Slobogin asserts that the
appropriate reference point for evaluating the relative invasiveness of
different government surveillance techniques should include some
assessment of societal attitudes and, thus, courts should begin with
the Katz declaration that the Fourth Amendment protects only
expectations of privacy that "society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable,"104 and as a second step, determine when a particular
government intrusion is justified. To determine this, Slobogin
suggests a four tier hierarchy that would apply across the board to all
searches and seizures. 105 Slobogin asserts that the two levels of
current justification, probable cause and reasonable suspicion, are
insufficient. To bolster the effectiveness of Fourth Amendment
scrutiny, he adds a standard of clear and convincing proof, as well as a
relevance standard to his proposed hierarchy. As described by
Slobogin, the revised hierarchy would consist of: (1) clear and
convincing proof: government must show clear and convincing proof
that the evidence sought is crucial to the state's case (75% level of
certainty); (2) probable cause: equated with a more-likely-than-not
finding or possibly a level of certainty slightly below that (51% level of
certainty); (3) reasonable suspicion: relaxation of the probable cause
standard (30% level of certainty); and (4) relevance standard: some
articulable reason for believing government action has some tendency
to lead to information helpful to solving a crime or apprehending a
suspect.
l1 Id.
102 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,536-37 (1967),
parentheticals added by Terry Court).
103 SLOBOGIN, supra note 95, at 32.
104 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
105 SLOBOGIN, supra note 95, at 38.
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For critics who tend to find his proportionality principle
unworkable, Slobogin explains that the justification for the hierarchy
he proposes is virtually identical to the Court's own template: "the
probable cause and reasonable suspicion standards are obviously
firmly ensconced, the relevance standard is routinely applied in
subpoena cases, and the clear and convincing standard is not that far
removed from the requirements the Court has imposed in surgery and
communications surveillance cases .... "106 Under this approach, vast
areas of intrusive police action that are currently unregulated,
including physical and transaction surveillance, would no longer be
outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment. Slobogin asserts that
the proportionality and exigency principles in his book would provide
a comprehensive framework, by regulating all government
investigative efforts, while remaining flexible enough to allow law
enforcement the ability to be proactive in solving crimes.
V. CONCLUSION
As communications technology advances, it becomes easier to
collect information on the growing number of consumers subscribing
to GPS services that require constant interaction with towers or
satellites. Along with this powerful technology comes a high potential
for abuse. In lieu of clear legislation on the issue, the battle between
the DOJ and the EFF continues, with district courts left divided over
what burden law enforcement must meet prior to accessing real-time
tracking data- some favoring the DOJ position and law enforcement's
need for information and others following the EFF position and
protecting the individual's right to privacy. Until higher courts
address the issue of what proof is required before carriers must
disclose real-time tracking information to law enforcement, any
conclusions to be drawn are strictly regional. Noting the lack of
jurisdictional consensus, recent decisions are requesting clear legal
standards controlling when the government can collect location
information from cell phone companies.1° 7
1o6 Id. at 46.
107 See In re App. of the U.S. for an Order Auth. the Use of a Pen Register, 384 F. Supp. 2d
562, 566 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("If the government intends to continue seeking authority to
obtain cell site location information... I urge it to seek appropriate review of this order so
that magistrate judges will have more authoritative guidance in determining whether
controlling law permits such relief.... ); see also In re Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device
with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 765 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (expressing "full
expectation and hope that the government will seek appropriate review by higher courts so
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The privacy violations arising from governmental abuse of GPS
data from cellular phones and vehicle tracking systems are vast, thus
legislative intervention is imperative. Without legislation specifying
the burden, law enforcement must produce before invading individual
privacy with GPS technology, courts are free to allow intrusion into
formally protected zones of privacy without requiring a high burden of
probable cause. Undoubtedly, GPS provides many benefits to its
users, but it remains to be seen whether the benefits of such
technology will be overshadowed by the potential for government
abuse of the information and the subsequent invasions of privacy.
that authoritative guidance will be given the magistrate judges who are called upon to rule
on these applications on a daily basis.").
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